Monday's Foxwoods Trip: Longest HE Session

[shipitfish]

In my last entry, I left off describing the $4/$8 game that I spent less than an hour in.

I spent only a short time in that game because I moved to a $5/$10 as soon as I was called for it. It was a new $5/$10 table being opened at the same (physical) table as the O/8 game I'd left. And, this new $5/$10 HE table had the same feel as the $4/$8 that I had just left. About half the players were fresh, and they started out playing pretty tight. I took the corner seat (which is more or less the situation in the corner of the whole poker room itself) -- Seat 2 of the table. The O/8 refugees, a regular and the Kansas fellow (who had been disagreeing with me about game break) had gotten chummy in that "we're both good players and everyone else isn't" sort of way took the Seats 6 and 7. An older gentleman -- a loose-passive calling station type -- took Seat 10. A similar style of player also took Seat 4. A loose-aggressive player had the Seat 3 immediately to my left.

Most poker books tell you to get loose-aggressive players to your right so you can see their raises coming and act appropriately to force pots to be heads-up or to entice callers behind. However, I actually don't mind such a player to my immediate left in an otherwise loose-passive game, because it can actually entice more action when I have the best of it. This is because many players may respect my raises more than his (and it's almost always a "him" -- young men tend to love that loose-aggressive play). Therefore, I can bet out good hands, get raised immediately, often by a weaker hand, and expect a few cold callers who think the raise is meaningless. I can then check-raise the next round or raise right there if I'd rather build the pot immediately and cause a whipsaw. Thus, I didn't mind this setup at all and it proved profitable in a few cases.

In fact, this two and a quarter hour session turned out to be my most profitable for the day, clearing $413 by winning only 6 of the 88 hands that I played. I was fortunate that at least half those won were kill pots, which inflated my winnings quite nicely.

There was a good bit of luck involved in my winning, though. One kill pot against the calling station in Seat 10 went as follows. The kill blind was posted somewhere in middle position, and two others limped in, including Seat 10. I was in the BB, and found the K K. I took the same amount of time that I always did to decide on my big blind and then threw another $10 in the pot. Everyone called, and we saw the flop four handed with $80 in the pot.

Many people don't like a raise in the BB, even with a really strong hand, because it simply telegraphs that you have AA, KK, AK or maybe AQ. However, I don't mind it so much in a loose-passive game. Loose passive players often try to second-guess such raises and are more likely to call with marginal holdings to look at a flop. And, after all, why not get your money in the pot when you're a favorite, even if it does telegraph your hand a bit (as long as the game isn't tricky)?

The flop came 9 7 2. I bet out, and two folded. The loose-passive player in Seat 10 raised, and I quickly reraised. He capped it. This fellow was very loose, but never this aggressive. I'd been playing with him for an hour, and never seen him come back over the top of someone. I felt, however, that he would slow-play a set a bit more. I am sure, however, that he had me beat. I figure that he holds 97s, a typical holding for him in late position. As I often do in such situations with someone who is very loose passive and susceptible to to psychological games, I said to the dealer, "Pair the right card on the board so it doesn't fill him up!", which is like saying out loud, "I he's got two pair".

His reaction wasn't what I hoped. The way he looked, I was sure he had a set now. I can't explain it, but there's something that weak, loose and passive players who've shown aggression suddenly do when you put them on the right hand out loud like that. But, he didn't do it, whatever it is I usually sense. So, I'm now pretty sure he has a set, and I am trying to think what I should do. I recalculated the pot at $160, and realize that I'm likely to have to sacrifice it because I just don't have odds to draw to two outs. As I am thinking this through, the miracle card turns: K.

Then, I did something totally stupid; I bet out. This is a debatable move out of context, but in this context, where I have said out-loud what I have and raised in the BB announcing a big pair, there's no reason to bet out when I hit my set. I am only going to win two bets in this case. However, if I check, he'll put me on AA, bet and I can check-raise. That gains me three more bets, maybe four. So that's a terrible mistake. I have to be careful, when I get cute saying stuff like that, to make sure that I keep that in context when I make betting decisions. He was sure to bet the turn, because I was acting like I had AA.

As you might guess, the river was a blank, and I got paid off by Seat 10's 2 2. I got the added benefit of having said the wrong read out loud. The rest of the table, my friend from Kansas in particular, began needling me about my "bad read". I silently took it; I actually think nearly all of the table didn't get what I had done. I had used that out-loud read to eliminate two pair as a possibility, not to show off.

Another kill pot I played a bit later was also very profitable. I limped from the cutoff with 6 6 after two others had limped and the kill blind had checked. The blinds came along and we saw the flop six-handed with $60 in the pot.

The flop came down 7 6 8. This is the exact flop where you don't want to flop a set into multi-way action. I know I'm going to get tons of action, and the outs of the rest of the table are surely overwhelming my hand at this point. OTOH, folding on this flop is just plain old tight-weak. The flop action went as follows: SB checks; BB bets; MP raises; I three-bet; the SB check-caps. So, I can put the SB on his exact hand; he's got T9. The question remains what the middle position player (MP) has. I can't really figure it out, but I am pretty worried about a bigger set. However, I had noticed that this player liked to raise from middle position with pairs of 88 or better, so that leaves only 77 as a possibility for a set. I figure he's got the idiot end of the straight, a flush draw, or a straight draw (the last being pretty unlikely, since he'd probably not raise on the come with such a weak draw).

The BB drops from the hand (he confirmed my read after the hand by saying had had A9), and the MP cold-calls two bets (!), and I call because the pot has now swelled to $180, and I don't have time to debate whether or not I am drawing to enough outs for 1-to-18 pot odds. I have to call.

The turn fell 5. This slightly decreased the chances that the MP had the idiot end of the straight. I began to think things through as the betting round starts. I am pretty sure I have to fold if the MP raises, because 77 is so likely if he doesn't have a straight, and another straight would be the only other holding he'd raise with with this 4-straight board. He's unlikely to bluff at this point.

Of course, the SB with the nut straight bets out, and MP just calls. Now, I was being offered 1-to-11 in this $220 pot. It was hard to figure out what MP has, and I was still a bit baffled. It's idiot-end, two-pair or a bigger set, but I can't figure it out. I decided to call, figuring that I'd seethis hand to the river even if I was drawing to a one-outer. If the board didn't pair, I was done anyway, and if it does, I'll figure it out from there.

The river comes the second best card that I can get: the 5. The reason this card was so good for me is three-fold:

• If the MP had the flush draw, he'd fold without any trouble when the SB bets.
• If the MP had 78 (top two on the flop), then I was full and he wasn't.
• I was now beating the SB (at least).

The SB bets out his last $20, declaring all-in. This is an interesting spot for me. The MP calls, and I have to decide if I want to raise or just call. I can really only put MP on one hand that beats me: 77. He might still just call with that here, because he'd want my overcall against the all-in player and a raise might scare me off if I hold only a straight. I thought for a moment, because I needed to convince myself that if I'm reraised, despite the size of the pot, I must be willing to drop my holding. I told myself that I have just got to do it, and if I can't do it, I have to just call here. I decided I could make the lay down if raised, because I was confident in my read, and I raised.

The MP threw his hand away, saying: "I flopped top two". He must have thought I had an overpair all along, which is why he threw it away so fast after going this far. I looked at the SB and say: "Sorry. I know that you've got T9, but I rivered a full." He turned over the holding I thought he had, and I raked in $280, still a bit unsure that the river raise was worth it. I felt the MP would call with any holding; I was actually somewhat surprised he folded top two. Had my read been better on what he was likely to do, probably just calling made more sense. Sometimes, I forget that even so-so players make the right play when I am in a "beaten if called" situation.

After the hand, someone said: "You always seem to catch the right card when the pot is big and not when the pot is small". I thought this was a funny thing for him to say. Of course, this was in part because I hit my two outer earlier. But it was also because I raise a lot when I have really strong holdings with many outs and try to check down those that aren't. Since the game was loose-passive, few people were pushing much, so I did get the opportunity to check down weak holdings, which is what led to his comment. I'm amazed sometimes that people can't work out why this happens for themselves. I guess people just don't spend much time thinking about the game, and the more I study, the "luckier" I seem to get.

After getting some sleep, I hope to finish up the story of my Monday at Foxwoods.

Comments

Feared or loved

[(Anonymous)]

At least in that game, I disagree with Machiavelli's theory that "if you must choose between being feared and loved, it is far better to be feared than loved."

Is his most recent Omaha hi/lo book, Cappelletti says something like: "In holdem, it's better to be feared than to be loved. In Omaha, it's better to be loved than feared." And supposedly this applies across structures and game textures. His rationale is that it's hard to make a hand in holdem (both for your weak opponents and for you), so a lot of your profits come from taking down pots uncontested with the worst hand or with a weak holding (i.e., one that would make a call correct for your opponents if they knew that's all you had, like an unimproved AK on the turn). In Omaha, usually you are continuing only with nutty hands/draws while your opponents are enticed by all the pretty card combinations in front of them, so most of your profits come from them giving you loose action.

Cappelletti's argument is more about human psychology and how people react to the cards in their hand and on the board than it is about poker "theory." From a nerdier perspective, the thing about a poker game that most affects whether you want to be loved or feared should be how hard it is to be sucked out on, not how hard it is to make your hand.

Walter Fong's Little Green Book of Holdem also espouses the theory that it's best to be feared in holdem. The cornerstone of his strategy is to build up his fearability by 1) never slowplaying, and 2) not bluffing. As his opponents start to fear him and start folding to his bets, he starts to mix in bluffs, but if he gets caught in a bluff, he stops bluffing and reverts to the "build up fearability" plan.