Monday's Foxwoods Trip: Longest HE Session

[shipitfish]

In my last entry, I left off describing the $4/$8 game that I spent less than an hour in.

I spent only a short time in that game because I moved to a $5/$10 as soon as I was called for it. It was a new $5/$10 table being opened at the same (physical) table as the O/8 game I'd left. And, this new $5/$10 HE table had the same feel as the $4/$8 that I had just left. About half the players were fresh, and they started out playing pretty tight. I took the corner seat (which is more or less the situation in the corner of the whole poker room itself) -- Seat 2 of the table. The O/8 refugees, a regular and the Kansas fellow (who had been disagreeing with me about game break) had gotten chummy in that "we're both good players and everyone else isn't" sort of way took the Seats 6 and 7. An older gentleman -- a loose-passive calling station type -- took Seat 10. A similar style of player also took Seat 4. A loose-aggressive player had the Seat 3 immediately to my left.

Most poker books tell you to get loose-aggressive players to your right so you can see their raises coming and act appropriately to force pots to be heads-up or to entice callers behind. However, I actually don't mind such a player to my immediate left in an otherwise loose-passive game, because it can actually entice more action when I have the best of it. This is because many players may respect my raises more than his (and it's almost always a "him" -- young men tend to love that loose-aggressive play). Therefore, I can bet out good hands, get raised immediately, often by a weaker hand, and expect a few cold callers who think the raise is meaningless. I can then check-raise the next round or raise right there if I'd rather build the pot immediately and cause a whipsaw. Thus, I didn't mind this setup at all and it proved profitable in a few cases.

In fact, this two and a quarter hour session turned out to be my most profitable for the day, clearing $413 by winning only 6 of the 88 hands that I played. I was fortunate that at least half those won were kill pots, which inflated my winnings quite nicely.

There was a good bit of luck involved in my winning, though. One kill pot against the calling station in Seat 10 went as follows. The kill blind was posted somewhere in middle position, and two others limped in, including Seat 10. I was in the BB, and found the K K. I took the same amount of time that I always did to decide on my big blind and then threw another $10 in the pot. Everyone called, and we saw the flop four handed with $80 in the pot.

Many people don't like a raise in the BB, even with a really strong hand, because it simply telegraphs that you have AA, KK, AK or maybe AQ. However, I don't mind it so much in a loose-passive game. Loose passive players often try to second-guess such raises and are more likely to call with marginal holdings to look at a flop. And, after all, why not get your money in the pot when you're a favorite, even if it does telegraph your hand a bit (as long as the game isn't tricky)?

The flop came 9 7 2. I bet out, and two folded. The loose-passive player in Seat 10 raised, and I quickly reraised. He capped it. This fellow was very loose, but never this aggressive. I'd been playing with him for an hour, and never seen him come back over the top of someone. I felt, however, that he would slow-play a set a bit more. I am sure, however, that he had me beat. I figure that he holds 97s, a typical holding for him in late position. As I often do in such situations with someone who is very loose passive and susceptible to to psychological games, I said to the dealer, "Pair the right card on the board so it doesn't fill him up!", which is like saying out loud, "I he's got two pair".

His reaction wasn't what I hoped. The way he looked, I was sure he had a set now. I can't explain it, but there's something that weak, loose and passive players who've shown aggression suddenly do when you put them on the right hand out loud like that. But, he didn't do it, whatever it is I usually sense. So, I'm now pretty sure he has a set, and I am trying to think what I should do. I recalculated the pot at $160, and realize that I'm likely to have to sacrifice it because I just don't have odds to draw to two outs. As I am thinking this through, the miracle card turns: K.

Then, I did something totally stupid; I bet out. This is a debatable move out of context, but in this context, where I have said out-loud what I have and raised in the BB announcing a big pair, there's no reason to bet out when I hit my set. I am only going to win two bets in this case. However, if I check, he'll put me on AA, bet and I can check-raise. That gains me three more bets, maybe four. So that's a terrible mistake. I have to be careful, when I get cute saying stuff like that, to make sure that I keep that in context when I make betting decisions. He was sure to bet the turn, because I was acting like I had AA.

As you might guess, the river was a blank, and I got paid off by Seat 10's 2 2. I got the added benefit of having said the wrong read out loud. The rest of the table, my friend from Kansas in particular, began needling me about my "bad read". I silently took it; I actually think nearly all of the table didn't get what I had done. I had used that out-loud read to eliminate two pair as a possibility, not to show off.

Another kill pot I played a bit later was also very profitable. I limped from the cutoff with 6 6 after two others had limped and the kill blind had checked. The blinds came along and we saw the flop six-handed with $60 in the pot.

The flop came down 7 6 8. This is the exact flop where you don't want to flop a set into multi-way action. I know I'm going to get tons of action, and the outs of the rest of the table are surely overwhelming my hand at this point. OTOH, folding on this flop is just plain old tight-weak. The flop action went as follows: SB checks; BB bets; MP raises; I three-bet; the SB check-caps. So, I can put the SB on his exact hand; he's got T9. The question remains what the middle position player (MP) has. I can't really figure it out, but I am pretty worried about a bigger set. However, I had noticed that this player liked to raise from middle position with pairs of 88 or better, so that leaves only 77 as a possibility for a set. I figure he's got the idiot end of the straight, a flush draw, or a straight draw (the last being pretty unlikely, since he'd probably not raise on the come with such a weak draw).

The BB drops from the hand (he confirmed my read after the hand by saying had had A9), and the MP cold-calls two bets (!), and I call because the pot has now swelled to $180, and I don't have time to debate whether or not I am drawing to enough outs for 1-to-18 pot odds. I have to call.

The turn fell 5. This slightly decreased the chances that the MP had the idiot end of the straight. I began to think things through as the betting round starts. I am pretty sure I have to fold if the MP raises, because 77 is so likely if he doesn't have a straight, and another straight would be the only other holding he'd raise with with this 4-straight board. He's unlikely to bluff at this point.

Of course, the SB with the nut straight bets out, and MP just calls. Now, I was being offered 1-to-11 in this $220 pot. It was hard to figure out what MP has, and I was still a bit baffled. It's idiot-end, two-pair or a bigger set, but I can't figure it out. I decided to call, figuring that I'd seethis hand to the river even if I was drawing to a one-outer. If the board didn't pair, I was done anyway, and if it does, I'll figure it out from there.

The river comes the second best card that I can get: the 5. The reason this card was so good for me is three-fold:

• If the MP had the flush draw, he'd fold without any trouble when the SB bets.
• If the MP had 78 (top two on the flop), then I was full and he wasn't.
• I was now beating the SB (at least).

The SB bets out his last $20, declaring all-in. This is an interesting spot for me. The MP calls, and I have to decide if I want to raise or just call. I can really only put MP on one hand that beats me: 77. He might still just call with that here, because he'd want my overcall against the all-in player and a raise might scare me off if I hold only a straight. I thought for a moment, because I needed to convince myself that if I'm reraised, despite the size of the pot, I must be willing to drop my holding. I told myself that I have just got to do it, and if I can't do it, I have to just call here. I decided I could make the lay down if raised, because I was confident in my read, and I raised.

The MP threw his hand away, saying: "I flopped top two". He must have thought I had an overpair all along, which is why he threw it away so fast after going this far. I looked at the SB and say: "Sorry. I know that you've got T9, but I rivered a full." He turned over the holding I thought he had, and I raked in $280, still a bit unsure that the river raise was worth it. I felt the MP would call with any holding; I was actually somewhat surprised he folded top two. Had my read been better on what he was likely to do, probably just calling made more sense. Sometimes, I forget that even so-so players make the right play when I am in a "beaten if called" situation.

After the hand, someone said: "You always seem to catch the right card when the pot is big and not when the pot is small". I thought this was a funny thing for him to say. Of course, this was in part because I hit my two outer earlier. But it was also because I raise a lot when I have really strong holdings with many outs and try to check down those that aren't. Since the game was loose-passive, few people were pushing much, so I did get the opportunity to check down weak holdings, which is what led to his comment. I'm amazed sometimes that people can't work out why this happens for themselves. I guess people just don't spend much time thinking about the game, and the more I study, the "luckier" I seem to get.

After getting some sleep, I hope to finish up the story of my Monday at Foxwoods.

Comments

Last hand

[roryk.livejournal.com]

If you are not sure if you are beating the person in front of you, but you are pretty sure you are beating the person behind you, you should just call on the river and hope the person behind you calls too.

In this spot, though, I would raise and call a reraise, because there are many hands the SB could have that you can beat and not too many that you can't.

No way I am folding for one more bet in this pot if the SB reraises me.

Re: Last Hand

[shipitfish.livejournal.com]

I see your point about calling that last bet if he reraises. I might have wimped out on my read and called for pot odds. Out of curousity, I just did the actual math on that situation. It turns out you were right about this, but it is close. I felt I was 90% sure that he'd only reraise if holding a hand that beats me. To call that reraise, the pot would then lay me 1-to-16, which is 94.2%. A call of the reraise then, does have positive EV. However, if I were 95% sure rather than just 90% sure, the call has negative EV. What a marginal situation! The fact that it's so marginal makes me feel like it is an edge not worth pushing.

Note too that the SB (who holds the straight) is all-in in this case, and it's the MP that I am now heads-up with for a side pot our raises will create. I think a reraise is mandatory if I believe the SB with the straight will pay off raises cold (and that fish would have if he had chips). In that case, both full houses are getting good EV from the straight-holder's bad play, even if I'm ultimately beat.

I spent some time trying to calculate the actual EV of the three situations (not raising, paying off the reraise, or folding if reraised) to see which one had the best EV. I had some trouble figuring it out, because I was unsure to factor in all the different percentages that come into play when the MP gives me more information by raising. I think that's the key factor in my EV -- that I become so sure . I haven't done a lot of complicated EV calculations, so I am going to have to reread Theory of Poker to remind myself how to do those kinds of complex calculations.

Re: Last hand

[roryk.livejournal.com]

There are two sources of error in your read-- the first is your read itself. You say you are 90% sure that he has you beat, because of course your read is not 100%. But there is error associated with that number as well, so you may be actually 95% sure or 85% sure but estimate it at 90%. To test yourself, take a line and then take 95% of the line and 90% of the line. Can you tell which is which if you haven't seen the other one? It is very hard to do.

What I am saying is that the pot is so large that folding is a mistake if there is any uncertainty at all. I counsel all of my friends that if the pot is very large and you have a good hand you have to call one more bet in a big pot if you have any uncertainty at all. Calling a bet when you are beat is a 1 BB mistake, but folding a pot you should have won could be as much as a 15 or 20 BB mistake. It is much better to lose the BB than lose the pot.

fur coat parable

In this case, with your hand, my opponent would have to show me his hand before I folded. You are right-- it is an edge not pushing. But the edge not worth pushing is folding. Just call in big pots for one more bet on the river.

If on the poker sites you play, you have a showdown won statistic that is high, you are folding too much. It should be like 55% or so, maybe a little less than that. Having one >60% means you are most likely dumping many winners. It is a stat most people don't think about much-- if you track your hands, check it out.

You are an extremely skilled player, but you have three major weaknesses. The first is that for some reason you like betting out into pots with 3-4 people in them with hands like bottom pair, and then folding to raises either on the flop or on later streets. A play I use against you all the time is to call with nothing and bet later or raise with nothing and bet later, because I am getting good odds you will fold. The second major weakness is you play too loose. The third is you call too many raises, both not in the blind and in the blind. I think if you played tighter and less fancy in terms of bets and folds you would crush whatever game you decided to play. You are much better at me than reading people and playing marginal hands well. I think you are a much better poker player in terms of natural ability and I don't understand why you are not playing the highest limits yet. Maybe these observations are why, I dunno.

That being said, I get creamed in Greg's game all the time so.. what do I know? :)

Comments on my play

[shipitfish.livejournal.com]

roryk wrote:

You are an extremely skilled player, but you have three major weaknesses: ... betting out into pots ... with hands like bottom pair, and then folding to raises; ... you play too loose; [and] you call too many raises

I am very appreciative of your analysis of my play! I think you're an excellent player and are frankly one of the few players I fear at Greg's game on limit nights. So, analysis from you is something I take very seriously.

You are quite right that my play on limit nights at Greg's has sometimes been very poor in many of the sessions when you and I both played. I recall many of the strategies you describe as experiments gone awry.

My feeling is often that Greg's game is so tight that I have to push marginal hands further and play looser to adjust in that game. I still think somewhat looser play in that game is correct (but tighter than I am typically playing there). However, you very correctly identified my key mistakes in my attempts to play looser: I far too often call raises cold (or from the blinds) with marginal holdings. It puts me in very complicated spots, and it lead me to do things like betting middle pair hoping that the flop missed people with overcards and they'll fold. I then compound that error by not following up with proper aggressiveness, which is precisely the reason those plays you use work so well. I also frequently fail to readjust when others arrive, and we cease to be a small group of tight-aggressive players. I too often ignore that constantly adjusting, and not "one adjust per night" is central to poker success. Lots of stuff to think about.

Indeed, I remember distinctly once calling you down when short-handed with a K9 on a K-J-x flop, despite that you'd thrown raises in and were playing very aggressively. When it was done, you had nothing, I said: "Huh?" and you said: "I knew you'd fold a Jack." I have thought about and reanalyzed that hand many times since then, and your explanation above clarifies my thinking about it now. Thanks for that!

I also have stupid psychological reasons for the mistakes I make in Greg's limit game, which are: I am enjoying myself and I like the people and just don't care if I leak off some online winnings to that group. So, I am very often not playing my best game there. That's of course silly. Even with my good friends in that group like nick_marden, I don't want to ever soft-play or otherwise goof-off, because we have the most fun when we're playing our best games against each other. Getting over that psychological factor, though, is something I really need to focus on if I'm going to be a positive-EV player in that limit game. (I'm doing much better in NL there than limit, as it turns out, and am working on a post about that.)

That 1 BB and the fur coat

[shipitfish.livejournal.com]

roryk wrote:

... so you may be actually 95% sure or 85% sure but estimate it at 90% ... It is very hard to [estimate odds at that level of perfection]. What I am saying is that the pot is so large that folding is a mistake if there is any uncertainty at all.

You make an excellent point and you're right that the fold just can't be right because no read can be perfect enough to make the fold correct. I guess that takes my back to my original theory, which is this: reraising given that the SB with nut-straight is all-in, seems like a play with negative EV, and even more so since you're forced to call for that marginal chance you're winning. I've think that, mathematically, even if my read is much less accurate than I thought, I might as well just call and not raise. I've got to sit down and chug through the math to be sure.

But, I think we're in total agreement that, should I chose to raise, I shouldn't ever have considered folding to a reraise. Even if the raise turns out to generate a negative EV situation, folding is surely even lower EV. (It's somewhat like the situation on the river in O/8, when you're sure you're being quartered and thus having a negative EV outcome for the hand, but you have to call to recover that quarter of the pot.)

Thus, even considering a fold if reraised is the real mistake I made. So, I'm sure glad he didn't reraise me, because I might have indeed given away the fur coat in exchange for the shrimp cocktail. (Although the parable you linked to was a bit raunchy for my tastes, I think it's point is accurate). BTW, this sort of issue is why I'm beginning to enjoy NL as much as limit play. In NL, you often are forced to consider whether or not you should give up on your first fur coat because you might make a bad choice and lose your second fur coat as well. The shrimp cocktails, OTOH, are your limps preflop with marginal hands to take all of someone else's fur coat money. They are very different games, but both very interesting.

Comments on roryk's play at Greg's

[shipitfish.livejournal.com]

roryk said: That being said, I get creamed in Greg's game all the time so.. what do I know? :)

As for your analysis of your own play in that game, I actually think you play is primarily just fine, but it's your table image that makes it difficult for you. You are too much pegged as "ultra-tight" in that game. It means, in many cases, you can make some mildly profitable bluffs, but that you are rarely in the big multi-way pots at those moments when everyone is willing to gamble. Two or three folks in that game have said to me, after a strange hand where I couldn't figure why they stayed: "It's fun to play pots with you, so I just wanted to make sure we played one together tonight". At least in that game, I disagree with Machiavelli's theory that "if you must choose between being feared and loved, it is far better to be feared than loved." Being loved in that game, even if it means being the butt-end of some cruel jokes, brings the chips in, in my opinion. Of course, I suppose I'm with Machiavelli that being both feared and loved would be nice in that game, but that's pretty difficult to do.

Re: Comments on roryk's play at Greg's

[roryk.livejournal.com]

It is funny, because I play much looser at Greg's game than I do in any other game, and I am positive that is the reason why I get creamed constantly in that game. It is an ego thing-- it is $4/8, how good could these guys be? But, they are good enough so that I cannot overcome the card advantage I am often giving. I would be better off playing my usual game in that game, I think.

I think it comes down to style. I am used to people always thinking I have the ace when it flops, because I usually do. I am content to take down little pots instead of big ones. I win by just not playing many hands and generally winning whatever little pots I am in on the flop. If I catch cards I accumulate a lot of money-- if I don't I lose the blinds every round and whatever but I don't lose much either because I am not playing many hands.

Playing too loose winds up messing up my postflop play at Greg's game, because my postflop play is predicated on the generation of a always-has-it image. I steal the blinds with crap in that game, and once I've shown some garbage a few times, I lose the cornerstone on which the rest of my play is based.

I tried to play like Bruce (and you to a lesser extent) does a few times, just to see what it was like. It requires a completely different skill set postflop which I don't have. It requires, I guess, better postflop skills that I have-- that is why I think you are a better player than me. I just wait for better cards than you do.

Re: Comments on roryk's play at Greg's

[roryk.livejournal.com]

This is all wrong now.

Feared or loved

[(Anonymous)]

At least in that game, I disagree with Machiavelli's theory that "if you must choose between being feared and loved, it is far better to be feared than loved."

Is his most recent Omaha hi/lo book, Cappelletti says something like: "In holdem, it's better to be feared than to be loved. In Omaha, it's better to be loved than feared." And supposedly this applies across structures and game textures. His rationale is that it's hard to make a hand in holdem (both for your weak opponents and for you), so a lot of your profits come from taking down pots uncontested with the worst hand or with a weak holding (i.e., one that would make a call correct for your opponents if they knew that's all you had, like an unimproved AK on the turn). In Omaha, usually you are continuing only with nutty hands/draws while your opponents are enticed by all the pretty card combinations in front of them, so most of your profits come from them giving you loose action.

Cappelletti's argument is more about human psychology and how people react to the cards in their hand and on the board than it is about poker "theory." From a nerdier perspective, the thing about a poker game that most affects whether you want to be loved or feared should be how hard it is to be sucked out on, not how hard it is to make your hand.

Walter Fong's Little Green Book of Holdem also espouses the theory that it's best to be feared in holdem. The cornerstone of his strategy is to build up his fearability by 1) never slowplaying, and 2) not bluffing. As his opponents start to fear him and start folding to his bets, he starts to mix in bluffs, but if he gets caught in a bluff, he stops bluffing and reverts to the "build up fearability" plan.